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Abstract 
 
This study assesses the relationship between tribalism (the tribalism index) and 
government effectiveness (per the World Bank) in 60 countries using cross-
sectional data. This study finds that countries with high tribal populations 
generally enjoy bad governance in terms of government ineffectiveness. 
Government ineffectiveness and tribalism are found to mutually reinforce each 
other in a robust relationship. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a substantial body of literature on the effect of ethnic diversity on the 
delivery of public commodities and the quality of government (e.g. Easterly and 
Levine, 1997;  La Porta et al. 1999; Treisman, 2000; Alesina et al. 2003; Miguel 
and Gugerty, 2005; Kimenyi, 2006; Habyarimana et al. 2007). The innovation of 
the present line of inquiry is to extend the underlying literature by assessing the 
relationship between tribalism and government effectiveness. Accordingly, 
tribalism represents a more holistic measurement compared to ethnic diversity 
because it is a proxy that more closely reflects actions by individuals than ‘ethnic 
diversity’ which reflects a situational element (Kodila-Tedika and Asongu, 2015).  
  We postulate that countries with higher levels of tribalism should deliver 
less government effectiveness. In other words, the formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver public commodities should be less 
apparent in countries with high levels of tribalism. Hence, the theoretical 
underpinnings associating ethnic diversity to low institutional quality are the same 
employed by this study. Meanwhile, as sustained earlier, tribalism represents a 
broader concept, relative to ethnic diversity.  
 In fact, tribalism is a doctrine which consists of unreasonably favouring 
individuals within a tribe or group of tribes. It is considered as an ethnic 
instrumentation by Mankou (2007). According to Jacobson and Deckard (2012), it 
entails scourges of corruption, rent seeking, inequality, indigenous population and 
group grievance. This note contributes to the existing literature by assessing the 
relationship between tribalism and government effectiveness.  
 The rest of the note is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data 
and methodology. The empirical analysis is covered in Section 3. Section 4 
concludes.  
 
2. Data 
The study assesses cross sections from 60 countries
1
. The choice of countries is 
based on data availability constraints in the control variables. Data on government 
effectiveness/efficiency is obtained from the dataset compiled by Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) at the World Bank. The indicator is based on 30 
underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of governance of a large number 
of survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide. Government 
effectiveness/efficiency is distributed between -2.5 (worst performance) and 2.5 
(best performance). 
To measure tribalism, we use the tribalism index data by Jacobson and 
Deckard (2012). It is a weighted aggregate of the components detailed, which 
                                                          
1
 Angola; Argentina; Australia; Belgium; Burkina Faso; Bangladesh; Brazil; Canada; Chile; China; 
Cote d'Ivoire; Cameroon; Colombia; Comoros; Czech Republic; Algeria; Ecuador; Egypt;  Spain ; 
France; UK; Ghana; Guatemala; Hungary; Indonesia; India; Italy; Kenya; Republic of Korea; Sri 
Lanka; Morocco; Madagascar; Mexico; Mali ; Mozambique; Malawi; Niger; Nigeria; Netherlands; 
Nepal; Pakistan; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russia; Senegal; Syria; Thailand; 
Tunisia; Turkey; Tanzania; Uganda; USA; Venezuela; Vietnam; South Africa;  Zambia and  
Zimbabwe. 
 
 ranges from a score of 0 (the hypothetical lowest score) to a score of 1 (the 
highest). Figure 1 shows that there exist substantial variations in tribalism across 
the world. The highest consumption levels can be found primarily in developing 
countries. 
 
 
 
As for control variables, we include openness to trade (or KOF index of 
economic globalization) from the literature (Dreher 2006; Dreher et al. 2008) for 
the year 2005 (from Penn World Tables 6.3); the log of GDP per capita for the 
year 2005 (from Penn World Tables 6.3); democracy for the year 2005 (from 
Cheibub et al. 2010); average years of schooling (% of population aged 25 and 
over) form Barro and Lee (2010); legal origins and geographical location to 
account for recent debates in the literature on the quality of institutions (e.g. 
Kodila-Tedika, 2014; Kodila-Tedika et al. 2013; Asongu, 2012). Following the 
trend in the literature, legal origin is captured by distinguishing between the 
English, French, German, Scandinavian and socialist legal heritages (La Porta et 
al. 1999). We estimate the model with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and robust 
standard errors. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1: Summary Statistics  
Variables Obs         Mean     Std. Dev.        Min         Max 
Government effective 
ness 
139     0.113   0.993 -1.751 2.217 
Tribalism  63     0.533 0.187 0.2 0.995 
Africa  180     0.306 0.462 0           1 
Americas  180     0.200 0.393   0           1 
Asia  180     0.244 0.431     0           1 
Europa  180     0.228 0.421   0           1 
Legal Origin (UK) 141     0.284 0.452 0           1 
Legal Origin (French) 141     0.447 0.499 0           1 
Legal Origin (German) 141     0.043 0.203 0           1 
Democracy  140 0.657 0.476  0           1 
GDP per capita (log) 140     8.871 1.188 5.903 11.173 
Economic globalization  134     63.286 16.172 26.963   96.342 
Obs : Observations. Std. Dev : Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.  
Table 1 below presents the summary statistics. From the means (that are 
comparable) and standard deviations (from which significant variations are 
apparent), we can be confident the reasonable estimated relationships would 
emerge.  
 
 
 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Basic results 
The graph below (or Figure 2) presents a visual relationship between tribalism and 
government effectiveness. We notice a trend with a decreasing tendency, which is 
an indication of a negative relationship between the two variables. It is however 
important to complement this exploratory visual relationship with some empirical 
relationship.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: The relationship between tribalism and government effectiveness  
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3.2. Results with tribalism as an exogenous variable 
Table 2 presents the basic results. Model 1 estimates the relationship between 
tribalism and government effectiveness/efficiency without a conditioning 
information set (or control variables) while the remaining models include some 
controls, unless where these were dropped due to multicollinearity. With the 
exception of the regional indicator, the control variables, included in these 
regressions display the expected signs and are statistically significant in several 
cases. Per capita income is statistically significant at the 1% level in Column 3 
and has the expected negative sign. Higher income is thus associated with high 
government effectiveness/efficiency (Asongu, 2014). The results show, however, 
that democracy does not have a significant effect on government 
effectiveness/efficiency. The KOF index of economic globalization is statistically 
significant at the 10% level and has the expected positive sign. Globalization thus 
improves government effectiveness (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016a). 
The variable of interest is negative and statistically significant in all cases.  
Accordingly, the coefficients of tribalism are statistically significant at the 1% 
level in all regressions. This coefficient is strongly significant. The first column 
 does not include other determinants. The tribalism variable accounts for 40.8% of 
variations in government effectiveness/efficiency. 
 
Table 2: Basic results 
 
1 2 3 
Tribalism -2.854*** -2.88*** -1.321*** 
 
(0.529) (0.683) (0.449) 
Africa 
 
-1.023*** -0.665* 
  
(0.267) (0.335) 
Americas 
 
-.834*** -1.476*** 
  
(0.263) (0,.359) 
Asia 
 
-2.606*** -0.846*** 
  
(0.208) (0.304) 
Europa 
 
-2.476*** 
-1.125*** 
  
(0.344) 
(0.313) 
GDP per capita (log) 
  
0.538*** 
   
(0.105) 
Democracy 
  
0.225 
   
(0.155) 
Economic globalization 
  
0.010 
   
(0.007) 
Legal Origin (UK) 
  
(0.174) 
   
0.083 
Legal Origin (French) 
  
(0.146) 
   
0.345 
Legal Origin (German) 
  
(0.223) 
   
0.251 
Constant 1.568*** 4.268*** 
-3.865*** 
 
(0.283) (0.282) (1.149) 
Number of observations 63 63 63 
Adjusted R
2
 0.408 0.58 0.80 
Notes:   ***;  **; *; Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Standard errors in brackets. UK: United Kingdom. Log: logarithm.  GDP: 
Gross Domestic Product.  
 
We verify if the established negative relationship withstands further empirical 
scrutiny in a plethora of robustness checks. In order to further improve the 
 estimations, we follow the empirical approach on M-estimators by Huber (1973) 
using Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (IRWLS). As Midi and Talib (2008) 
have noted, compared to  the  OLS approach, the advantage of these robust 
estimators is that they simultaneously fix any issue arising from the existence of 
outliers and/or heteroskedasticity (non-constant error variances).  We find in 
Table 2 that the signs and significance of the variables across specifications are 
consistent with those of Table 3.  
In Table 3, more control variables are used. The additional control 
variables include: average years of schooling (Barro and Lee, 2010), social trust 
(Bjørnskov, 2011), size of the shadow economy (Dreher and Schneider 2010) and 
an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) dummy 
variable. The signs of the independent variables of interest are consistent with 
those in Tables 2.  
 Table 2:  Regression results (extended conditioning information set) 
 
eq1 eq4 eq2 eq3 
Tribalism  -1.373*** -0.210 -0.925* -0.925* 
 
(0.490) (0.362) (0.534) (0.399) 
Africa (dropped) -0.407 -0.151 -0.151* 
  
(0,364) (0,538) (0.055) 
Americas  -0.787*** -0,424 -0.798 -0.798** 
 
(0.264) (0.351) (0.518) (0.223) 
Asia  -0.213 -0.343 -0.345 -0.345** 
 
(0.179) (0.328) (0.484) (0.116) 
Europa  -0.509 -0.529 -0.737 -0.737* 
 
(0.305) (0.347) (0.513) (0.281) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.510*** 0.243* 0.266 0.266** 
 
(0.121) (0.130) (0.192) (0.069) 
Democracy  0.166 0.098 0.187 0.187 
 
(0.158) (0.123) (0.182) (0.179) 
Economic globalization 0.013* 0.030*** 0.018** 0.018** 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Legal Origin (UK) 0.270 0.504*** 0.374 0.374* 
 
(0.231) (0.170) (0.251) (0.169) 
Legal Origin (French) 0.113 0.130 0.109 0.109 
 
(0.214) (0.176) (0.259) (0.058) 
Legal Origin (German) 0.406 0.691** 0.393 0.393** 
 
(0,.369) (0.269) (0.397) (0.113) 
Social trust 
 
0.001 0.004 0.004 
  
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
OECD 
 
0.009 0.286 0.286* 
  
(0.143) (0.211) (0.133) 
Schadow  
 
-0.023*** -0.015** -0.015* 
  
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Schooling  
 
-0.007 0.033 0.033* 
  
(0.032) (0.047) (0.013) 
Constant -4.372*** -2.971** -2.698 -2.698** 
 
(0.918) (1.148) (1.693) (0.866) 
Cluster continent No No Yes Yes 
IRWLS Yes No No Yes 
Number of observations 58 44 44 44 
R² 0.819 0.956 0.905 0.905 
Adjusted  R² 
 
0.8543 
  
Notes:   ***;  **; *; Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. GDP: Gross 
Domestic Product. IRWLS:  Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares. 
 
 
 
 
 3.2. Result with tribalism as an endogenous variable 
Studies have consistently established the corollary of tribalism, notably: 
that ethnic fragmentation affects the quality of institutions (La Porta et al. 1999; 
Easterly and Levine, 2001; Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina et al. 2003). Among the 
rare studies that have considered ethnic fragmentation as a consequence of 
institutions is Leeson (2005). Prior, Easterly (2001) had established that best 
institutions can attenuate the negative impacts of ethnic fragmentation. Leeson 
(2005) builds on Easterly (2001) to show that issues of ethnic fragmentation (e.g. 
tribalism) are consolidated in the presence of poor institutions. The author 
demonstrates from the pre-colonial era of Africa that poor institutions were 
caused by tribal configurations or ethnic problems. Hence according to Leeson 
(2005), ethnic fragmentation is both exogenous and endogenous to the quality of 
institutions.  
The notion that ethnic fragmentation could be endogenous has been 
explored by Michalopoulos (2012) and Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) in a clear and 
substantive manner. However, the idea of testing the particular hypothesis of 
Leeson (2005) has not been covered in the literature. Hence, we are attempting to 
test this hypothesis in order to isolate the effect of ethnic fragmentation within the 
framework of tribalism on government institutions. Wang and Steiner (2015) and 
Churchill et al.  (2015) have employed differences in elevation, land quality, and 
latitude as instruments for enthnolinguistic diversity. Within the framework of this 
study, latitude is employed which has been demonstrated by Ahlerup and Olsson 
(2012) to be exogenous to ethnic fragmentation and/or tribalism. This is simply 
explained in the perspective that the literature employs this variable are a 
regressor for the quality of institutions. Hence, we are left with the instruments of 
Michalopoulos (2012), namely: elevation and variation in land quality. 
Michalopoulos (2012) and Wang and Steiner (2015) have documented the 
theoretical discourse on the validity of these instruments.  
 Table 3: Estimation with Instrumental variables  
 
eq1 eq2 eq3 eq4 
Tribalism -4.148*** -5.223** -3.415 -2.851 
 
(1.345) (2.651) (3.668) (3.075) 
Africa 
 
-3.427*** -1.601 -1.409 
  
(0.874) (1.837) (1.500) 
Americas 
 
-4.135*** -2.741 -2.378 
  
(1.481) (2.141) (1.869) 
Asia 
 
-3.258*** -1.762 -1.513 
  
(0.997) (1.745) (1.393) 
Europa 
 
-3.520** -2.386 -1.938 
  
(1.544) (2.092) (1.682) 
GDP per capita (log) 
  
0.468* 0.457** 
   
(0.261) (0.179) 
Democracy 
  
0.088 0.069 
   
(0.390) (0.307) 
Economic globalization 
  
0.005 0.007 
   
(0.008) (0.009) 
Legal Origin (UK) 
   
0.338 
    
(0.206) 
Legal Origin (French) 
   
0.230 
    
(0.320) 
Legal Origin (German) 
   
0.303 
    
(0.259) 
Constant 2.286*** 6.328*** -0.566 -1.421 
 
(0.723) (2.417) (6.428) (4.924) 
Number of observations 59 59 59 59 
Sargan statistic  (p-value)  0.1731  0.7580  0.5795 0.5208 
Adjusted  R² 0.319 0.507 0.761 0.801 
Notes:   ***;  **; *; Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
 In Table 3, we test the validity of the instruments employed in 
Michalopoulos (2012), Wang and Steiner (2015) and Churchill et al. (2015). The 
null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying restrictions test which is not 
overwhelmingly rejected confirms the validity of the instruments. It is important 
to note that the two instrumental variables are drawn from Michalopoulos (2012). 
Moreover, the specifications of Table 4 are consistent with those in Table 3. 
Accordingly, the control variables are progressively added to from the left-hand-
side to the right-hand-side. A consistent negative relationship between tribalism 
and the dependent variable is apparent. Hence evidence of causality flowing from 
tribalism to government effectiveness is apparent when instrumental variables are 
 employed. However, this conclusion should be treated with caution because the 
last-two estimations in Table 3, while robust, are not significant.  
 
 
4. Concluding implications and future research directions  
We argue in this article that the level of tribalism is likely to affect the 
government effectiveness/efficiency enjoyed by the population of a country. Our 
econometric analysis has established that countries with high-tribal populations 
generally enjoy bad governance in terms of government ineffectiveness. 
Government ineffectiveness and tribalism are found to mutually reinforce each 
other in a robust relationship. 
 Given that government effectiveness is assimilated to economic 
governance which is the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver 
public commodities (see Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016bc), high levels of 
tribalism within a nation prevent the government from implementing measures 
that enhance inclusive and human development. Given that inclusiveness is a 
central theme in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda, future research 
can focus on assessing whether the established findings withstand scrutiny within 
the framework of inclusive human development.  
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